

A Note on Valuation of Trust, Social Capital and Development^Y

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This short note attempts to briefly focus on the relevance of trust among people and on the government to ensure higher effectiveness of any socioeconomic policies. This very issue has not received much attention in the mainstream literature hitherto, whereas the role of social capital has been accepted as a major catalyst for development. Thus we strive to relate the dimension of valuation of trust with the efficacy of social capital and the incidence of COVID-19 infections in some selected countries.

Keywords: Trust, Social Capital, Health

JEL classification: Z13, A13, B52, I18

1. Introduction and the backdrop

The world has witnessed a huge economic shock due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Starting with China, a majority of countries has adopted some version of lockdown – either complete or partial of all social activity – as a mitigating step to control the spread of the infection. In India, the lockdown started across the country on March 24, 2020 and is still ongoing in some parts of the country mostly in discrete manner.

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Certain countries like India, Pakistan, Italy had come down heavily by locking all sorts of economic activities, right from confining people in their homes to shutting down offices and businesses and eventually leading to a virtual closing of the economy. However, a better understanding of whether and how communities respond to government decisions is crucial for policy makers and health officials in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

In most countries hit by the pandemic, authorities adopted measures to impose “social distancing” to curb the uncontrolled spread of the virus, limit infections and deaths, and ease the pressure on the health system and health service providers. By now it is apparent that the corona virus infection spreads when the infected population comes into contact with the susceptible population. Studies so far have shown that early governmental actions along with public cooperation can indeed slow down the spread of the contagion (Anderson et al., 2020; Bai et al., 2020). Hence, lockdowns can be potentially very effective if the number of susceptible people running into the infected lot is considerably reduced. The rate of increase in infection does not depend solely on the immunological parameter. It also depends on the economic and social behavior that would have an impact on ‘matching’ between the susceptible and the infected lot. To put it differently, the rate of the spread of the infection would very much depend on how the people spend their time outside in relation to their economic activity, and the various customs and norms. So, it is plausible that only lockdown cannot possibly have all the desired effects, rather people will have to adapt to the new normal of social distancing and change their ways of interaction which reflect our perception about the society.

Researchers and scholars have been consistently trying to find what had been the main determining factors that led to the acceleration of the spread of the corona virus infection. However, if we look closely into the valuation of the variable ‘trust’ by the citizens of a particular country, a very interesting picture emerges. Literature on ‘trust’ starts with Francis Fukuyama arguing that cooperation or cooperative economic behavior is principally stimulated by a culture of ‘trust’ which is critical to explaining differing national economic performance patterns (Fukuyama, 1996). An experimental examination of Fukuyama’s conjecture in

the context of Sweden (a high trust country) and India (a low trust country) was undertaken by Ahmed and Salas (2008) which validated that the higher the level of trust in a country the less corrupt, the more developed, and wealthier its economy is. Jalan and Sen (2020) studied the remarkable success in containing the pandemic in the Indian state of Kerala and credited it to the reinforced public trust in the government by the citizens. Thus, when we come to the question of trust, we always hope that the party whom we have entrusted ourselves with will always act in our best interest (Hall et al., 2001). A high level of trust in the health system also fosters a sense of cooperation with the system in adopting all public health measures recommended by the system (Kehoe and Ponting, 2003).

Therefore, this paper attempts to focus on the relevance of trust among people and on the government to ensure effectiveness of socioeconomic policy in a multi-country context. Given the recognized importance of generalized trust and the variability of trust across countries, we try to explore if trust plays a role in the incidence of COVID infections. There is no denying the fact that almost all countries had imposed lockdown to halt the sweeping spread of the virus, but still we encountered countries with different levels of infections. Hence the question lurking within us was whether trust in its various forms and the degree of governance in these countries had some hand in it. We also look at the stringency of the lockdown imposed on these countries and whether the results reflect the same impression. The results reveal that out-group trust and political stability has an impact on the incidence of COVID infection. Hence, our study contributes to the existing literature by focusing on a set of issues that might have shaped the actual compliance in various economies of the world. More precisely, we examine the relationship between incidence of COVID infection and trust along with various governance indicators. With the way the virus spreads, social distancing is not seen as a personal choice but rather an ethical duty. Therefore, community attachment – mainly manifested by social trust – is more likely to be associated with higher preventive behavior.

The remaining paper is structured as follows. Section 2 defines some relevant concepts. Section 3 talks about data, methodology and basic findings of this

paper. The last section concludes. Descriptive statistics are provided in the appendix.

2. The concept of ‘trust’: In-group trust vis-à-vis Out-group trust

Definitions of social capital abound and vary with quite divergent views. Such capital should not be considered only as an economic entity as social exchanges are not purely driven by self-interest. Rather social exchanges also need to encompass capital and profit in all their forms. Thus social capital becomes a ‘resource’ that can be used to enhance one’s wealth and status and to ‘marginalize’ others from full participation in social, economic and political life. Besides, social capital is productive and makes possible the achievement of certain ends, which had been hitherto unachievable. Besides, such dimension of social capital may well be extended beyond being a resource to include people’s sense of belonging to their community, community cohesion, reciprocity and trust, and positive attitudes to community institutions like participation in community activities. However, some consensus on a definition has been reached, namely, that social capital comprises “the norms and networks that facilitate collective action” (Woolcock, 2001).

Although initially social capital was thought to be a one-dimensional construct that produces only positive outcomes, it is by now generally acknowledged that various types of social capital exist. In this respect Putnam (2000) distinguishes between two types of social capital, i.e. bonding and bridging social capital. The latter type can be defined as bonds of connectedness formed across diverse social groups, whereas bonding social capital cements only homogenous groups. According to a widely held view, bonding social capital is also referred to as generalized trust. Its prevalence amongst people is the key component of social capital and provides the solution to any cooperation dilemma under which societies could possibly suffer (Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 1993; Ostrom, 1994) and the present raging pandemic is an apt case in point. Delving further into the issue, most scholars agree on the distinction between in-group trust and out-group trust (Portes, 1998; Sztompka, 1999; Beugelsdijk and Smulders, 2004). Alternatively, literature also uses the terms ‘particular’ and ‘general’ trust, or

‘bonding’ to denote in-group trust and ‘bridging’ trust to denote out-group trust. In-group trust is limited to familiar people such as relatives, friends, and acquaintances. Out-group trust relates to people whom one does not know or who differ in group-identity characteristics, like nationality and religion. Thus both types of trust - in-group and out-group can manifest themselves only when they are engaged in various networks that provide opportunities for social interactions.

Granovetter (1973) believes that in-group trust is mainly dominant in traditional societies where the insider-outsider boundary is very difficult to penetrate. They trust insiders more than outsiders in this Antagonism Theory. The theory further states that individuals are controlled in-groupwise (Geertz, 1963). Familyism is built between two parties so that they tend to cooperate between them or else any betrayal would prove costly to them as a deep intimacy develops that might lead to revenge in the context of adverse circumstances. A different strand of thought had emerged which preaches just the opposite view – a positive link between in-group trust and out-group trust popularly known as the Unity Theory¹. This school of thought argues that trust is learned in early childhood and persists in later life, creating a *capacity to trust*. Again, the Prerequisite Theory also assumes a positive association between in-group trust and out-group trust and advocates that trust is learnt through experiences of cooperation with others (Hardin, 2002).

3.1 The stringency of government response and trust

The Government Response Stringency Index², is a composite measure of the strictness of government policies, and should not be interpreted as ‘scoring’ the

¹ This approach considers trust in others as a general personality trait that is manifest vis-à-vis anyone, whether in-group or out-group (Uslaner, 2002).

² To enable comparisons of the lockdowns imposed by different countries in the world, a team at Oxford University’s Blavatnik School of Government is maintaining a database of pandemic-response policies and using it to derive an index of the measures’ overall stringency. Containment policies such as closures of school and workplace, public events, public transport, stay-at-home policies etc. are examined in detail and a composite score is computed between 0 and 100 – a higher index score indicates a higher level of stringency.

appropriateness or effectiveness of a country's response. In a huge contrasting revelation, the Survey was quick to point out that north-western Europe have citizens who value trust a lot and has no qualms in trusting their governments and fellow citizens in comparison to its Southern and Eastern European counterparts. To come to concrete examples, we find that more than 60% of the Swedes said that they trusted most of the people, while only 30% Italians does so and in the case of the Romanians, it is a measly 7%. Higher trust also seems to influence responses to COVID-19. It gets reflected in the behavior of the citizens during lockdown too. Thus, one can say that trusting countries have generally implemented less stringent lockdowns. Rather than harshly enforcing social-distancing rules, their governments rely on citizens to observe guidelines voluntarily. Sweden, with a population of over ten millions was one of the countries who did not enforce a lockdown. South Korea never imposed a government designed curfew as such or stopped its people from going to work. So without even a proper lockdown they were able to keep the situation under control as they followed a strategy of aggressive testing, contact tracing and isolation.

In terms of stringency, we find countries like India and Pakistan in South Asia, Italy, Slovenia, and Greece in Europe, and Equador and Peru in South America had enforced very high level of stringency in their containment measures (See Table 1 and Figure 1).

The Eastern European countries like Romania, Greece and Poland are generally known to be quite low-trust countries. Hence, they locked hard and fast fearing that their citizens would not follow the strictures issued by the government. Revenues collected from fines in these countries would help to get a peek into level of stringency of lockdowns in the various countries. From March 24th, 2020 to April 19th, 2020 the Romanian police issued 200,000 fines (worth \$69m) to people who failed to comply with restrictions to curb the spread of corona virus. The Romanians also have to fill out an official form before they leave home explaining why they have gone out. The form has to be presented along with an identity card if they are stopped by the police or military. Such quick, tough responses have helped the eastern European countries to be relatively


unscathed from the worst of the pandemic. Confirmed death rates in Poland and Romania are less than a tenth those in hard-hit countries such as France, Italy and Spain. However, the fines should not be understood as the main reason for people to abide the rules. In the Romanian context, the people are so disillusioned with the government and the shaggy health infrastructure that they voluntarily try to stick to the right word. Hence, trust in the government and institutions can go a long way in changing the way people decided to interact in the COVID-19 period.

Table 1: Trust, Stringency, and the incidence of Covid-19 Infection
(as on 2nd September, 2020)

Country	Average Trust Index	Stringency of lockdown Index	Total Corona cases per million population	Total Corona Infection
Brazil	7.1	66	18802	4,001,422
Ecuador	7.2	97	6527	115,457
Peru	8.4	92	20074	663,437
Malaysia	8.5	80	289	9,360
Turkey	11.6	89	3235	273,301
Mexico	12.4	85	4692	606,036
India	16.7	97	2784	3,848,968
Slovenia	19.9	94	1433	2,979
Poland	22.2	79	1811	68,517
Pakistan	22.2	97	1338	296,590
South Africa	23.3	56	10610	630,595
South Korea	26.5	80	399	20,449
Russia	27.8	92	6886	1,005,000
United States	34.8	61	18986	6,290,737
Japan	35.9	56	546	69,001
Kazakhstan	38.3	85	5631	105,944
China	60.3	75	59	85,066

Sources: 1. Incidence of COVID-19 infection data accessed from <https://www.worldometers.info/>; 2. Trust variable accessed from <https://ec.europa.eu/> and <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp>; 3. Stringency Index accessed from <https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/>

Figure-1: Trust and Lockdown Stringency



On the other hand, Germany is a high trust country and so they opted for a less stringent lockdown relying on the good intentions and values of the citizens. Germany did not need any sort of provocative policing; whereas the Netherlands being a high trust country also went for implementing an “intelligent lockdown”. In the process, the Netherlands intended to cushion the social, economic and psychological costs of social isolation and make the eventual return to normality more manageable. The government did not put restrictions on roaming outdoors but specified a distance of 1.5 metres. The compliant Dutch people did restrict their outdoor mobility by 40%.

3.2 Data and Methodology

The primary dependent variable for this study is the incidence of COVID-19 cases in some selected countries of the world accessed from <https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/> on 2nd September, 2020. We resorted to the World Values Survey (WVS) which provides data on socio-

cultural and political change worldwide. It consists of national sample surveys in over 50 countries, using a common questionnaire with variables on beliefs, values, economic development, democratisation, religion, gender equality, social capital, and subjective well-being. We have relied on the response to the generalized trust question asked in the World Values Survey (WVS) or General Social Survey (GSS). The generalized trust question is the following: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” which would be termed as ‘overall trust’ in our study.

Questions asking about the trust factor in ‘your neighbourhood’ and ‘people you know personally’ are classified as in-group trust and ‘people you meet for the first time’ viz. strangers and ‘people of another religion’ are classified as out-group trust.

We also took into account the six governance indicators which were assembled and epitomized by WGI (World Governance Indicators) from thirty existing data sources on the nature & quality of governance. Log value of governance indicators are not taken in light of the fact that their value scales from -2.5 to +2.5. Definitions of these indicators follow World Bank. Higher values of each of these indicators indicate better governance.

1. **Regulatory Quality (RQ)** – Regulatory Quality captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. Estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5 (Kraay et. al., 2010).
2. **Voice and Accountability (VOA)** – The index for Voice & Accountability captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. Estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5 (Kraay et. al., 2010)

3. **Political Stability (PS)** – Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism. Estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5 (Kraay et. al., 2010).
4. **Government Effectiveness (GE)** – Government Effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. Estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5 (Kraay et. al., 2010)
5. **Rule of Law (ROL)** – Rule of Law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5 (Kraay et. al., 2010).

In order to study the effect of In-group trust and Out-group trust on the incidence of COVID-19 infection in 50 countries OLS model was used that also included the various governance indicators like Regulatory Quality (RQ), Voice and Accountability (VOA), Political Stability (PS), Government Effectiveness (GE) and Rule of Law (ROL). Each of the governance indicators would help to relate to the extent of compliance the citizens of a particular country are subjecting themselves to in terms of following the social distancing norms and curbing mobility.

We also used data from the Government Response Stringency Index to understand the stringency of lockdown imposed in various countries. The data is collected from publicly available information by a cross-disciplinary Oxford

University team of academics and students from every part of the world, led by the Blavatnik School of Government. It is a composite measure based on nine response indicators including school closures, workplace closures, and travel bans, rescaled to a value from 0 to 100 (100 = strictest response). This index simply records the number and strictness of government policies, and should not be interpreted as ‘scoring’ the appropriateness or effectiveness of a country’s response.

We use three control variables –GDP per capita (GDP_PC), poverty head-count ratio at \$1.90 per day (PHCR), and urban population as a percentage of the total population (Urban_pop). World Bank data have been used for GDP per capita and PHCR while the urbanisation data has been used from Global Change Data Lab (<https://ourworldindata.org/urbanization>).

3.3 Model and variable description

Theoretically, a society strong in terms of in-group and out-group trust believes that its citizens should be behaving responsibly and hence would not resort to very strict lockdowns. However, as already discussed in the preceding section, a high trust society may still end up with high infection rates because of less severity in the lockdown. Along with the imposition of lockdown, we should not fail to include the governance parameters, as they go a long way in ensuring the effectiveness of lockdowns imposed in various countries. It should be reiterated that the ‘stringency index’ used in this paper does not indicate the effectiveness of the lockdown, rather they only state the number and strictness of the government policies. The incidence of COVID-19 infections also depends on factors like GDP per capita, poverty head count ratio and urbanization captured by the proportion of urban population in the total population, which are taken as control variables in the regressions.

The paper employs a set of multivariate regression models. In Model 1 the primary independent variables in the models are the five aforementioned governance variables taken from the World Bank’s WGI, the in-group trust variables and the out-group trust variables. All the models also include controls

for per capita GDP taken from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (for the year 2019). Since countries with better trust are usually governed well, hence separate regressions were done to check whether they had any impact on the incidence of COVID-19 infections. Thus, Model 2 takes into consideration only the trust variables while Model 3 takes into consideration only the governance variables. In Model 4, we take all the trust and governance variables along with the stringency index.

The trust variables do not have significant impact on the incidence of COVID-19 infections (MODEL 2), but when the governance variables are regressed in Model 3 we find "political stability" as statistically significant implying that economies with stronger political stability have experienced less COVID-19 infections. However when we consider both the groups of trust variables and governance indicators, the out-group trust variable (trust_religion) and political stability become statistically significant. Even when we take into consideration 'stringency index' as another independent variable, we get the same result.

So, it indicates that economies with high out-group trust are more susceptible to the COVID-19 infection in comparison to the economies enjoying high in-group trust. This is the pitfall in relying too much on social capital, which some economies did, but met with adverse results i.e. an increase in corona infected population.

A person may well be more likely to take the risk of shaking hands with another person during a pandemic, if that is the norm normally followed in the society in which they live. However, we argue that they are more likely to engage in this behavior with their in-group members and might be less susceptible to the infection as they have proper information regarding the health parameters of their group members. However, in terms of out-group members like people from other religion or strangers, people more readily recognize the risk posed by them, and take appropriate precautions (Cruwys et. al., 2020). Economies with more out-group trust, say trusting people from other religion, are more prone to have higher infections as portrayed by our result.

Interestingly political stability turns out to be a significant covariate in both the models. Political stability is often regarded as a proxy for people's trust on the prevailing political arrangements that may help them abide by the declared state interventionist policies. Another possibility is the experience of such political parties regarding how and when to intervene in case of socio-economic crisis. This is perhaps why we find negative impact of political stability on corona infection. Detailed results of the econometric tests are shown in the following table.

Table 2: OLS regression: COVID Infection

	DEPENDENT VARIABLE: INCIDENCE OF COVID INFECTIONS (lnCOVID)			
VARIABLES	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Trust_neighbourhood	0.00268	0.0108		-0.00183
	(0.051)	(0.0514)		(0.0517)
Trust_personally	-0.042	-0.0462		-0.0368
	(0.051)	(0.0507)		(0.0518)
Trust_strangers	-0.299	-0.145		-0.295
	(0.226)	(0.234)		(0.228)
Trust_religion	0.313**	0.195		0.318**
	(0.143)	(0.136)		(0.145)
Stringency_Index				0.0211
				(0.0174)
RQ	1.617		1.127	1.659
	(1.034)		(1.022)	(1.05)
GE	-0.29		0.765	-0.731
	(1.677)		(1.596)	(1.734)
VOA	-0.0305		0.528	-0.14
	(0.532)		(0.476)	(0.544)

ROL	-1.068		-1.972	-0.511
	(1.387)		(1.273)	(1.471)
PS	-1.340**		-1.023*	-1.338**
	(0.587)		(0.577)	(0.593)
Urban_pop	-0.0236	-0.0122	-0.0156	-0.0232
	(0.0252)	(0.0249)	(0.0248)	(0.0254)
lnGDP_PC	1.040*	0.269	0.729	1.020*
	(0.585)	(0.451)	(0.56)	(0.593)
PHCR	0.0225	-0.00206	0.0109	0.0326
	(0.0272)	(0.0284)	(0.0248)	(0.0287)
Constant	2.771	9.824***	4.99	1.469
	(4.352)	(3.434)	(4.149)	(4.568)
Observations	50	50	50	49
R-squared	0.306	0.075	0.206	0.334

Note: The estimated standard errors of the estimated coefficients of the independent variables are listed in parentheses below the predictors. lnGDP_PC is a log of the GDP per capita; lnCOVID is the log of COVID infections on 2nd September, 2020.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

3.4 Trust and the missing link

The whole discussion of lockdown, nevertheless, becomes ineffective if these countries have been unable to keep their COVID-19 related death fatalities low. It does not matter if you have a strict lockdown but still not able to keep the infection and fatality low. However, Germany with a very lenient lockdown did clock the least fatality rate by taking a leaf out of the South Korean experience of ‘testing and tracking’. On top of that the people’s trust in the government and a rational decision-making at the highest level of the government helped the Germans to mirror a better picture of the pandemic relative to their European counterparts. The picture is different for other high-trust countries like the Netherlands and Sweden – they did rely on targeted lockdown but their fatality and infection rates were also quite high. So we say that trust acts as a double-

edged sword for them – on one hand they would probably perform better economically as they had kept the economy's engine moving but they might falter in terms of spread of COVID-19. Instead of reaping the dividend of high trust, they might have just been pushed to the rear and lulled into a sense of false security.

The idea that the social fabric can be regarded as a valued component for socioeconomic development essentially gave birth to the concept of social capital. We thus see that social capital can contribute to the health outcomes of the people at the micro-level. It helps to access the resources (while economic capital helps to buy them) by providing access to information through networks and act as facilitators of achieving common goals. The concept has also gained widespread recognition as being relevant for development with the World Bank endorsing that social capital is the 'missing link' in development. Over the last decade, the concept of social capital has become increasingly important in the sphere of public health but it is still in its nascent stage. Cattell (2001) in his study shows that in England, although the material living conditions and the socio-economic position of the individuals are strong predictors of adverse health outcomes than various social capital indicators, people with invariably poor health were low in social capital content. One of the effects of poverty is to undermine community network and relationships. However, the much needed economic regeneration should also be accompanied by social regeneration if their ultimate goal of health improvement needs to be achieved. In Asian countries, the effect of social capital on health has been less studied than in the West. Considering the difference in cultural and historical backgrounds between the Asian and the Western countries, it remains unclear whether the beneficial effect of social capital on health persists in the Asian region. Therefore, the effect of social capital on health may vary among countries and cultures. In any effort to determine the universality of the relationship between high social capital and good health, it becomes important to establish whether such a relationship also exists in Asia, particularly in India.

It is also hypothesized that there are both direct and indirect returns on the production and accumulation of health and social capital (Rose 2000; Islam et al

2006; Khawaja et al 2006). Direct returns originates from the fact that both health and social capital enhance individual welfare, while indirect returns come about as a result of the observation that health capital increases the amount of productive time, and social capital improves the efficiency of the production technology used for producing health capital.

4. Conclusion

Social capital has gradually become an essential but debated concept within social epidemiology and public health research. Whether social capital is a collective feature, or an individual attribute, has been widely discussed. Nowadays several researchers advocate that social capital has both individual and collective characteristics even though the level of analysis requires distinct theoretical and methodological considerations.

In the context of the present pandemic, higher social capital could imply greater in-person interaction and risk of contracting the infection. On the other hand, as discussed earlier, social capital can endow individuals with a greater concern for others as it is allied with greater trust and relationships within a community. This may unsurprisingly lead to more hygienic practices and social distancing leading to lockdowns becoming more effective and meaningful. During this transition phase from lockdown to unlock, therefore, we must bear in mind that relaxing the rules relies on good testing and tracing, with public trust and social capital as vital components for compliance as these two have long lasting impacts on the process of socioeconomic development of the world as a whole. So, societies with more rigidly bound in-group trust participants (endowed more with bonding social capital) might be at less risk of contracting the infection than a society with higher magnitudes of out-group trust (endowed with more bridging social capital).

Thus we can say that our social identities are hugely endowed with a capacity to shape our perceptions of 'trust' towards others. Because of this, our evaluation of risk versus safety is inextricably tied to our group memberships. These arguments are not, of course, limited to COVID-19. However, in the absence of

any clinical and medical solutions to COVID-19 (e.g., vaccines), it is vital that we harness all the tools at our disposal in the fight against its deadly spread. Hence, in this paper we argued that applying our understanding of the social determinants of health risk perception and health risk behaviour is one such tool.

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Appendix

Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	Max
lnCOVID	50	11.074	2.093	7.31	15.652
Trust_neig~d	50	22.02	11.83	3.8	55.9
Trust_pers~y	50	23.92	10.763	7.1	61.3
Trust_stra~s	50	2.484	2.119	.1	8.9
Trust_reli~n	50	4.829	3.328	.3	15.7
Stringency~x	50	64.66	19.575	25	97
RQ	50	.197	1.028	-2.279	2.206
GE	50	.228	.975	-2.244	2.231
VOA	50	-.081	.962	-1.751	1.611
ROL	50	.067	.996	-1.79	1.896
PS	50	-.32	1.031	-3.002	1.51
Urban_pop	50	69.013	20.573	17.125	100
lnGDP_PC	50	9.134	1.203	6.808	11.035
PHCR	50	6.22	14.015	0	62.1

Country List

Algeria	Ecuador	Kazakhstan	Peru	Spain
Argentina	Egypt	Kuwait	Philippines	Sweden
Armenia	Georgia	Kyrgyzstan	Poland	Thailand
Australia	Germany	Lebanon	Qatar	Turkey
Azerbaijan	Ghana	Malaysia	Russia	Ukraine
Brazil	Hong Kong SAR	Mexico	Rwanda	United States
Chile	India	Morocco	Singapore	Uruguay
China	Iraq	Netherlands	Slovenia	Uzbekistan
Colombia	Japan	Nigeria	South Africa	Yemen
Cyprus	Jordan	Pakistan	South Korea	Zimbabwe